#![cfg_attr(docsrs, feature(doc_cfg))]

#![doc = include_str!("../README.md")]

// @@ begin lint list maintained by maint/add_warning @@

#![allow(renamed_and_removed_lints)] // @@REMOVE_WHEN(ci_arti_stable)

#![allow(unknown_lints)] // @@REMOVE_WHEN(ci_arti_nightly)

#![warn(missing_docs)]

#![warn(noop_method_call)]

#![warn(unreachable_pub)]

#![warn(clippy::all)]

#![deny(clippy::await_holding_lock)]

#![deny(clippy::cargo_common_metadata)]

#![deny(clippy::cast_lossless)]

#![deny(clippy::checked_conversions)]

#![warn(clippy::cognitive_complexity)]

#![deny(clippy::debug_assert_with_mut_call)]

#![deny(clippy::exhaustive_enums)]

#![deny(clippy::exhaustive_structs)]

#![deny(clippy::expl_impl_clone_on_copy)]

#![deny(clippy::fallible_impl_from)]

#![deny(clippy::implicit_clone)]

#![deny(clippy::large_stack_arrays)]

#![warn(clippy::manual_ok_or)]

#![deny(clippy::missing_docs_in_private_items)]

#![warn(clippy::needless_borrow)]

#![warn(clippy::needless_pass_by_value)]

#![warn(clippy::option_option)]

#![deny(clippy::print_stderr)]

#![deny(clippy::print_stdout)]

#![warn(clippy::rc_buffer)]

#![deny(clippy::ref_option_ref)]

#![warn(clippy::semicolon_if_nothing_returned)]

#![warn(clippy::trait_duplication_in_bounds)]

#![deny(clippy::unchecked_time_subtraction)]

#![deny(clippy::unnecessary_wraps)]

#![warn(clippy::unseparated_literal_suffix)]

#![deny(clippy::unwrap_used)]

#![deny(clippy::mod_module_files)]

#![allow(clippy::let_unit_value)] // This can reasonably be done for explicitness

#![allow(clippy::uninlined_format_args)]

#![allow(clippy::significant_drop_in_scrutinee)] // arti/-/merge_requests/588/#note_2812945

#![allow(clippy::result_large_err)] // temporary workaround for arti#587

#![allow(clippy::needless_raw_string_hashes)] // complained-about code is fine, often best

#![allow(clippy::needless_lifetimes)] // See arti#1765

#![allow(mismatched_lifetime_syntaxes)] // temporary workaround for arti#2060

#![allow(clippy::collapsible_if)] // See arti#2342

#![deny(clippy::unused_async)]

//! <!-- @@ end lint list maintained by maint/add_warning @@ -->

mod err;

pub mod rsa;

#[cfg(feature = "x509")]

pub use tor_cert_x509 as x509;

use caret::caret_int;

use tor_bytes::{Error as BytesError, Result as BytesResult};

use tor_bytes::{Readable, Reader};

use tor_llcrypto::pk::*;

use std::time;

pub use err::CertError;

#[cfg(feature = "encode")]

mod encode;

#[cfg(feature = "encode")]

pub use encode::EncodedEd25519Cert;

#[cfg(feature = "encode")]

pub use err::CertEncodeError;

/// A Result defined to use CertError

type CertResult<T> = std::result::Result<T, CertError>;

caret_int! {

    /// Recognized values for Tor's certificate type field.

    ///

    /// In the names used here, "X_V_Y" means "key X verifying key Y",

    /// whereas "X_CC_Y" means "key X cross-certifying key Y".  In both

    /// cases, X is the key that is doing the signing, and Y is the key

    /// or object that is getting signed.

    ///

    /// Not every one of these types is valid for an Ed25519

    /// certificate.  Some are for X.509 certs in a CERTS cell; some

    /// are for RSA->Ed crosscerts in a CERTS cell.

    pub struct CertType(u8) {

        /// TLS link key, signed with RSA identity. X.509 format. (Obsolete)

        TLS_LINK_X509 = 0x01,

        /// Self-signed RSA identity certificate. X.509 format. (Legacy)

        RSA_ID_X509 = 0x02,

        /// RSA lnk authentication key signed with RSA identity

        /// key. X.509 format. (Obsolete)

        LINK_AUTH_X509 = 0x03,

        /// Identity verifying a signing key, directly.

        IDENTITY_V_SIGNING = 0x04,

        /// Signing key verifying a TLS certificate by digest.

        SIGNING_V_TLS_CERT = 0x05,

        /// Signing key verifying a link authentication key.

        SIGNING_V_LINK_AUTH = 0x06,

        /// RSA identity key certifying an Ed25519 identity key. RSA

        /// crosscert format. (Legacy)

        RSA_ID_V_IDENTITY = 0x07,

        /// For onion services: short-term descriptor signing key

        /// (`KP_hs_desc_sign`), signed with blinded onion service identity

        /// (`KP_hs_blind_id`).

        HS_BLINDED_ID_V_SIGNING = 0x08,

        /// For onion services: Introduction point authentication key

        /// (`KP_hs_ipt_sid`), signed with short term descriptor signing key

        /// (`KP_hs_desc_sign`).

        ///

        /// This one is, sadly, a bit complicated. In the original specification

        /// it was meant to be a cross-certificate, where the signature would be

        /// _on_ the descriptor signing key, _signed with_ the intro TID key.

        /// But we got it backwards in the C Tor implementation, and now, for

        /// compatibility, we are stuck doing it backwards in the future.

        ///

        /// If we find in the future that it is actually important to

        /// cross-certify these keys (as originally intended), then we should

        /// add a new certificate type, and put the new certificate in the onion

        /// service descriptor.

        HS_IP_V_SIGNING = 0x09,

        /// An ntor key converted to a ed25519 key, cross-certifying an

        /// identity key.

        NTOR_CC_IDENTITY = 0x0A,

        /// For onion services: Ntor encryption key (`KP_hss_ntor`),

        /// converted to ed25519, signed with the descriptor signing key

        /// (`KP_hs_desc_sign`).

        ///

        /// As with [`HS_IP_V_SIGNING`](CertType::HS_IP_V_SIGNING), this

        /// certificate type is backwards.  In the original specification it was

        /// meant to be a cross certificate, with the signing and signed keys

        /// reversed.

        HS_IP_CC_SIGNING = 0x0B,

        /// For relays: family key certifying membership of a relay

        /// by signing its identity.

        FAMILY_V_IDENTITY = 0x0C,

    }

}

caret_int! {

    /// Extension identifiers for extensions in certificates.

    pub struct ExtType(u8) {

        /// Extension indicating an Ed25519 key that signed this certificate.

        ///

        /// Certificates do not always contain the key that signed them.

        SIGNED_WITH_ED25519_KEY = 0x04,

    }

}

caret_int! {

    /// Identifiers for the type of key or object getting signed.

    pub struct KeyType(u8) {

        /// Identifier for an Ed25519 key.

        ED25519_KEY = 0x01,

        /// Identifier for the SHA256 of an DER-encoded RSA key.

        SHA256_OF_RSA = 0x02,

        /// Identifies the SHA256 of an X.509 certificate.

        SHA256_OF_X509 = 0x03,

    }

}

/// Structure for an Ed25519-signed certificate as described in Tor's

/// cert-spec.txt.

#[derive(Debug, Clone)]

#[cfg_attr(feature = "encode", derive(derive_builder::Builder))]

#[cfg_attr(

    feature = "encode",

    builder(name = "Ed25519CertConstructor", build_fn(skip))

)]

pub struct Ed25519Cert {

    /// How many _hours_ after the epoch will this certificate expire?

    #[cfg_attr(feature = "encode", builder(setter(custom)))]

    exp_hours: u32,

    /// Type of the certificate; recognized values are in certtype::*

    cert_type: CertType,

    /// The key or object being certified.

    cert_key: CertifiedKey,

    /// A list of extensions.

    #[allow(unused)]

    #[cfg_attr(feature = "encode", builder(setter(custom)))]

    extensions: Vec<CertExt>,

    /// The key that signed this cert.

    ///

    /// Once the cert has been unwrapped from an KeyUnknownCert, this field will

    /// be set.  If there is a `SignedWithEd25519` extension in

    /// `self.extensions`, this will match it.

    #[cfg_attr(feature = "encode", builder(setter(custom)))]

    signed_with: Option<ed25519::Ed25519Identity>,

}

/// One of the data types that can be certified by an Ed25519Cert.

#[derive(Debug, Clone)]

#[non_exhaustive]

pub enum CertifiedKey {

    /// An Ed25519 public key, signed directly.

    Ed25519(ed25519::Ed25519Identity),

    /// The SHA256 digest of a DER-encoded RsaPublicKey

    RsaSha256Digest([u8; 32]),

    /// The SHA256 digest of an X.509 certificate.

    X509Sha256Digest([u8; 32]),

    /// Some unrecognized key type.

    Unrecognized(UnrecognizedKey),

}

/// A key whose type we didn't recognize.

#[derive(Debug, Clone)]

pub struct UnrecognizedKey {

    /// Actual type of the key.

    key_type: KeyType,

    /// digest of the key, or the key itself.

    key_digest: [u8; 32],

}

impl CertifiedKey {

    /// Return the byte that identifies the type of this key.

        }

    /// Return the bytes that are used for the body of this certified

    /// key or object.

        }

    /// If this is an Ed25519 public key, return Some(key).

    /// Otherwise, return None.

        }

    /// Try to extract a CertifiedKey from a Reader, given that we have

    /// already read its type as `key_type`.

            _ => CertifiedKey::Unrecognized(UnrecognizedKey {

            }),

        })

}

/// An extension in a Tor certificate.

#[derive(Debug, Clone)]

enum CertExt {

    /// Indicates which Ed25519 public key signed this cert.

    SignedWithEd25519(SignedWithEd25519Ext),

    /// An extension whose identity we don't recognize.

    Unrecognized(UnrecognizedExt),

}

/// Any unrecognized extension on a Tor certificate.

#[derive(Debug, Clone)]

#[allow(unused)]

struct UnrecognizedExt {

    /// True iff this extension must be understand in order to validate the

    /// certificate.

    affects_validation: bool,

    /// The type of the extension

    ext_type: ExtType,

    /// The body of the extension.

    body: Vec<u8>,

}

impl CertExt {

    /// Return the identifier code for this Extension.

        }

}

/// Extension indicating that a key that signed a given certificate.

#[derive(Debug, Clone)]

struct SignedWithEd25519Ext {

    /// The key that signed the certificate including this extension.

    pk: ed25519::Ed25519Identity,

}

impl Readable for CertExt {

            ExtType::SIGNED_WITH_ED25519_KEY => CertExt::SignedWithEd25519(SignedWithEd25519Ext {

            }),

            _ => {

            }

        })

}

impl Ed25519Cert {

    /// Try to decode a certificate from a byte slice.

    ///

    /// This function returns an error if the byte slice is not

    /// completely exhausted.

    ///

    /// Note that the resulting KeyUnknownCertificate is not checked

    /// for validity at all: you will need to provide it with an expected

    /// signing key, then check it for timeliness and well-signedness.

            // This would be something other than a "v1" certificate. We don't

            // understand those.

        // This is a workaround for a tor bug: the key type is

        // wrong. It was fixed in tor#40124, which got merged into Tor

        // 0.4.5.x and later.

        }

        };

    /// Return the time at which this certificate becomes expired

    /// Return true iff this certificate will be expired at the time `when`.

    /// Return the signed key or object that is authenticated by this

    /// certificate.

    /// Return the ed25519 key that signed this certificate.

    /// Return the type of this certificate.

}

/// A parsed Ed25519 certificate. Maybe it includes its signing key;

/// maybe it doesn't.

///

/// To validate this cert, either it must contain its signing key,

/// or the caller must know the signing key.  In the first case, call

/// [`should_have_signing_key`](KeyUnknownCert::should_have_signing_key);

/// in the latter, call

/// [`should_be_signed_with`](KeyUnknownCert::should_be_signed_with).

#[derive(Clone, Debug)]

pub struct KeyUnknownCert {

    /// The certificate whose signing key might not be known.

    cert: UncheckedCert,

}

impl KeyUnknownCert {

    /// Return the certificate type of the underling cert.

    /// Return subject key of the underlying cert.

    /// Check whether a given pkey is (or might be) a key that has correctly

    /// signed this certificate.

    ///

    /// If pkey is None, this certificate must contain its signing key.

    ///

    /// On success, we can check whether the certificate is well-signed;

    /// otherwise, we can't check the certificate.

    #[deprecated(

        since = "0.7.1",

        note = "Use should_have_signing_key or should_be_signed_with instead."

    )]

        }

    /// Declare that this should be a self-contained certificate that contains its own

    /// signing key.

    ///

    /// On success, this certificate did indeed turn out to be self-contained, and so

    /// we can validate it.

    /// On failure, this certificate was not self-contained.

        };

    /// Declare that this should be a certificate signed with a given key.

    ///

    /// On success, this certificate either listed the provided key, or did not

    /// list any key: in either case, we can validate it.

    /// On failure, this certificate claims to be signed with a different key.

        };

}

/// A certificate that has been parsed, but whose signature and

/// timeliness have not been checked.

#[derive(Debug, Clone)]

pub struct UncheckedCert {

    /// The parsed certificate, possibly modified by inserting an externally

    /// supplied key as its signing key.

    cert: Ed25519Cert,

    /// The signed text of the certificate. (Checking ed25519 signatures

    /// forces us to store this.

    // TODO(nickm)  It would be better to store a hash here, but we

    // don't have the right Ed25519 API.

    text: Vec<u8>,

    /// The alleged signature

    signature: ed25519::Signature,

}

/// A certificate that has been parsed and signature-checked, but whose

/// timeliness has not been checked.

pub struct SigCheckedCert {

    /// The certificate that might or might not be timely

    cert: Ed25519Cert,

}

impl UncheckedCert {

    /// Split this unchecked cert into a component that assumes it has

    /// been checked, and a signature to validate.

        use tor_checkable::SelfSigned;

    /// Return subject key of the underlying cert.

    /// Return signing key of the underlying cert.

}

impl tor_checkable::SelfSigned<SigCheckedCert> for UncheckedCert {

    type Error = CertError;

}

impl tor_checkable::Timebound<Ed25519Cert> for Ed25519Cert {

    type Error = tor_checkable::TimeValidityError;

        } else {

        }

}

impl tor_checkable::Timebound<Ed25519Cert> for SigCheckedCert {

    type Error = tor_checkable::TimeValidityError;

}

#[cfg(test)]

mod test {

    // @@ begin test lint list maintained by maint/add_warning @@

    #![allow(clippy::bool_assert_comparison)]

    #![allow(clippy::clone_on_copy)]

    #![allow(clippy::dbg_macro)]

    #![allow(clippy::mixed_attributes_style)]

    #![allow(clippy::print_stderr)]

    #![allow(clippy::print_stdout)]

    #![allow(clippy::single_char_pattern)]

    #![allow(clippy::unwrap_used)]

    #![allow(clippy::unchecked_time_subtraction)]

    #![allow(clippy::useless_vec)]

    #![allow(clippy::needless_pass_by_value)]

    //! <!-- @@ end test lint list maintained by maint/add_warning @@ -->

    use super::*;

    use hex_literal::hex;

    #[test]

    fn parse_unrecognized_ext() -> BytesResult<()> {

        // case one: a flag is set but we don't know it

        let b = hex!("0009 99 10 657874656e73696f6e");

        let mut r = Reader::from_slice(&b);

        let e: CertExt = r.extract()?;

        r.should_be_exhausted()?;

        assert_eq!(e.ext_id(), 0x99.into());

        // case two: we've been told to ignore the cert if we can't

        // handle the extension.

        let b = hex!("0009 99 11 657874656e73696f6e");

        let mut r = Reader::from_slice(&b);

        let e: Result<CertExt, BytesError> = r.extract();

        assert!(e.is_err());

        assert_eq!(

            e.err().unwrap(),

            BytesError::InvalidMessage(

                "unrecognized certificate extension, with 'affects_validation' flag set.".into()

            )

        );

        Ok(())

    }

    #[test]

    fn certified_key() -> BytesResult<()> {

        let b =

            hex!("4c27616d6f757220756e6974206365757820717527656e636861c3ae6e616974206c6520666572");

        let mut r = Reader::from_slice(&b);

        let ck = CertifiedKey::from_reader(KeyType::SHA256_OF_RSA, &mut r)?;

        assert_eq!(ck.as_bytes(), &b[..32]);

        assert_eq!(ck.key_type(), KeyType::SHA256_OF_RSA);

        assert_eq!(r.remaining(), 7);

        let mut r = Reader::from_slice(&b);

        let ck = CertifiedKey::from_reader(42.into(), &mut r)?;

        assert_eq!(ck.as_bytes(), &b[..32]);

        assert_eq!(ck.key_type(), 42.into());

        assert_eq!(r.remaining(), 7);

        Ok(())

    }

}