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//! Implementation for onion service descriptors.
//!
//! An onion service descriptor is a document generated by an onion service and
//! uploaded to one or more HsDir nodes for clients to later download. It tells
//! the onion service client where to find the current introduction points for
//! the onion service, and how to connect to them.
//! An onion service descriptor is more complicated than most other
//! documentation types, because it is partially encrypted.
mod desc_enc;
#[cfg(feature = "hs-service")]
mod build;
mod inner;
mod middle;
mod outer;
pub mod pow;
pub use desc_enc::DecryptionError;
use tor_basic_utils::rangebounds::RangeBoundsExt;
use tor_error::internal;
use crate::{NetdocErrorKind as EK, Result};
use tor_checkable::signed::{self, SignatureGated};
use tor_checkable::timed::{self, TimerangeBound};
use tor_checkable::{SelfSigned, Timebound};
use tor_hscrypto::pk::{HsBlindId, HsClientDescEncKeypair, HsIntroPtSessionIdKey, HsSvcNtorKey};
use tor_hscrypto::{RevisionCounter, Subcredential};
use tor_linkspec::EncodedLinkSpec;
use tor_llcrypto::pk::curve25519;
use tor_units::IntegerMinutes;
use derive_builder::Builder;
use smallvec::SmallVec;
use std::result::Result as StdResult;
use std::time::SystemTime;
pub use {inner::HsDescInner, middle::HsDescMiddle, outer::HsDescOuter};
pub use build::{HsDescBuilder, create_desc_sign_key_cert};
/// Metadata about an onion service descriptor, as stored at an HsDir.
///
/// This object is parsed from the outermost document of an onion service
/// descriptor, and used on the HsDir to maintain its index. It does not
/// include the inner documents' information about introduction points, since the
/// HsDir cannot decrypt those without knowing the onion service's un-blinded
/// identity.
/// The HsDir caches this value, along with the original text of the descriptor.
#[cfg(feature = "hs-dir")]
#[allow(dead_code)] // TODO RELAY: Remove this.
pub struct StoredHsDescMeta {
/// The blinded onion identity for this descriptor. (This is the only
/// identity that the HsDir knows.)
blinded_id: HsBlindId,
/// Information about the expiration and revision counter for this
/// descriptor.
idx_info: IndexInfo,
}
/// An unchecked StoredHsDescMeta: parsed, but not checked for liveness or validity.
pub type UncheckedStoredHsDescMeta =
signed::SignatureGated<timed::TimerangeBound<StoredHsDescMeta>>;
/// Information about how long to hold a given onion service descriptor, and
/// when to replace it.
#[derive(Debug, Clone)]
struct IndexInfo {
/// The lifetime in minutes that this descriptor should be held after it is
/// received.
#[allow(dead_code)] // TODO RELAY: Remove this if there turns out to be no need for it.
lifetime: IntegerMinutes<u16>,
/// The expiration time on the `descriptor-signing-key-cert` included in this
signing_cert_expires: SystemTime,
/// The revision counter on this descriptor: higher values should replace
/// older ones.
revision: RevisionCounter,
/// A decrypted, decoded onion service descriptor.
/// This object includes information from both the outer (plaintext) document of
/// the descriptor, and the inner (encrypted) documents. It tells the client the
/// information it needs to contact the onion service, including necessary
/// introduction points and public keys.
pub struct HsDesc {
/// The list of authentication types that this onion service supports.
auth_required: Option<SmallVec<[IntroAuthType; 2]>>,
/// If true, this a "single onion service" and is not trying to keep its own location private.
is_single_onion_service: bool,
/// One or more introduction points used to contact the onion service.
intro_points: Vec<IntroPointDesc>,
/// A list of offered proof-of-work parameters, at most one per type.
pow_params: pow::PowParamSet,
// /// A list of recognized CREATE handshakes that this onion service supports.
//
// TODO: When someday we add a "create2 format" other than "hs-ntor", we
// should turn this into a caret enum, record this info, and expose it.
// create2_formats: Vec<u32>,
/// A type of authentication that is required when introducing to an onion
/// service.
#[non_exhaustive]
#[derive(Debug, Clone, Copy, Eq, PartialEq, derive_more::Display)]
pub enum IntroAuthType {
/// Ed25519 authentication is required.
#[display("ed25519")]
Ed25519,
/// Information in an onion service descriptor about a single
/// introduction point.
#[derive(Debug, Clone, amplify::Getters, Builder)]
#[builder(pattern = "owned")] // mirrors HsDescBuilder
pub struct IntroPointDesc {
/// The list of link specifiers needed to extend a circuit to the introduction point.
/// These can include public keys and network addresses.
/// Note that we do not enforce the presence of any link specifiers here;
/// this means that you can't assume that an `IntroPointDesc` is a meaningful
/// `ChanTarget` without some processing.
// The builder setter takes a `Vec` directly. This seems fine.
#[getter(skip)]
link_specifiers: Vec<EncodedLinkSpec>,
/// The key to be used to extend a circuit _to the introduction point_, using the
/// ntor or ntor3 handshakes. (`KP_ntor`)
#[builder(setter(name = "ipt_kp_ntor"))] // TODO rename the internal variable too
ipt_ntor_key: curve25519::PublicKey,
/// The key to be used to identify the onion service at this introduction point.
/// (`KP_hs_ipt_sid`)
#[builder(setter(name = "kp_hs_ipt_sid"))] // TODO rename the internal variable too
ipt_sid_key: HsIntroPtSessionIdKey,
/// `KP_hss_ntor`, the key used to encrypt a handshake _to the onion
/// service_ when using this introduction point.
/// The onion service uses a separate key of this type with each
/// introduction point as part of its strategy for preventing replay
/// attacks.
#[builder(setter(name = "kp_hss_ntor"))] // TODO rename the internal variable too
svc_ntor_key: HsSvcNtorKey,
/// An onion service after it has been parsed by the client, but not yet decrypted.
pub struct EncryptedHsDesc {
/// The un-decoded outer document of our onion service descriptor.
outer_doc: outer::HsDescOuter,
/// An unchecked HsDesc: parsed, but not checked for liveness or validity.
pub type UncheckedEncryptedHsDesc = signed::SignatureGated<timed::TimerangeBound<EncryptedHsDesc>>;
impl StoredHsDescMeta {
// TODO relay: needs accessor functions too. (Let's not use public fields; we
// are likely to want to mess with the repr of these types.)
/// Parse the outermost layer of the descriptor in `input`, and return the
/// resulting metadata (if possible).
pub fn parse(input: &str) -> Result<UncheckedStoredHsDescMeta> {
let outer = outer::HsDescOuter::parse(input)?;
Ok(outer.dangerously_map(|timebound| {
timebound.dangerously_map(|outer| StoredHsDescMeta::from_outer_doc(&outer))
}))
impl HsDesc {
/// Parse the outermost document of the descriptor in `input`, and validate
/// that its identity is consistent with `blinded_onion_id`.
/// On success, the caller will get a wrapped object which they must
/// validate and then decrypt.
/// Use [`HsDesc::parse_decrypt_validate`] if you just need an [`HsDesc`] and don't want to
/// handle the validation/decryption of the wrapped object yourself.
/// # Example
/// ```
/// # use hex_literal::hex;
/// # use tor_checkable::{SelfSigned, Timebound};
/// # use tor_netdoc::doc::hsdesc::HsDesc;
/// # use tor_netdoc::Error;
/// #
/// # let unparsed_desc: &str = include_str!("../../testdata/hsdesc1.txt");
/// # let blinded_id =
/// # hex!("43cc0d62fc6252f578705ca645a46109e265290343b1137e90189744b20b3f2d").into();
/// # let subcredential =
/// # hex!("78210A0D2C72BB7A0CAF606BCD938B9A3696894FDDDBC3B87D424753A7E3DF37").into();
/// # let timestamp = humantime::parse_rfc3339("2023-01-23T15:00:00Z").unwrap();
/// // Parse the descriptor
/// let unchecked_desc = HsDesc::parse(unparsed_desc, &blinded_id)?;
/// // Validate the signature and timeliness of the outer document
/// let checked_desc = unchecked_desc
/// .check_signature()?
/// .check_valid_at(×tamp)?;
/// // Decrypt the outer and inner layers of the descriptor
/// let unchecked_decrypted_desc = checked_desc.decrypt(&subcredential, None)?;
/// // Validate the signature and timeliness of the inner document
/// let hsdesc = unchecked_decrypted_desc
/// .check_valid_at(×tamp)?
/// .check_signature()?;
/// # Ok::<(), anyhow::Error>(())
pub fn parse(
input: &str,
// We don't actually need this to parse the HsDesc, but we _do_ need it to prevent
// a nasty pattern where we forget to check that we got the right one.
blinded_onion_id: &HsBlindId,
) -> Result<UncheckedEncryptedHsDesc> {
let mut id_matches = false;
let result = outer.dangerously_map(|timebound| {
timebound.dangerously_map(|outer| {
id_matches = blinded_onion_id == &outer.blinded_id();
EncryptedHsDesc::from_outer_doc(outer)
})
});
if !id_matches {
return Err(
EK::BadObjectVal.with_msg("onion service descriptor did not have the expected ID")
);
Ok(result)
/// A convenience function for parsing, decrypting and validating HS descriptors.
/// This function:
/// * parses the outermost document of the descriptor in `input`, and validates that its
/// identity is consistent with `blinded_onion_id`.
/// * decrypts both layers of encryption in the onion service descriptor. If `hsc_desc_enc`
/// is provided, we use it to decrypt the inner encryption layer;
/// otherwise, we require that
/// the inner document is encrypted using the "no restricted discovery" method.
/// * checks if both layers are valid at the `valid_at` timestamp
/// * validates the signatures on both layers
/// Returns an error if the descriptor cannot be parsed, or if one of the validation steps
/// fails.
pub fn parse_decrypt_validate(
valid_at: SystemTime,
subcredential: &Subcredential,
hsc_desc_enc: Option<&HsClientDescEncKeypair>,
) -> StdResult<TimerangeBound<Self>, HsDescError> {
use HsDescError as E;
let unchecked_desc = Self::parse(input, blinded_onion_id)
.map_err(E::OuterParsing)?
.check_signature()
.map_err(|e| E::OuterValidation(e.into()))?;
let (inner_desc, new_bounds) = {
// We use is_valid_at and dangerously_into_parts instead of check_valid_at because we
// need the time bounds of the outer layer (for computing the intersection with the
// time bounds of the inner layer).
unchecked_desc
.is_valid_at(&valid_at)
// It's safe to use dangerously_peek() as we've just checked if unchecked_desc is
// valid at the current time
let inner_timerangebound = unchecked_desc
.dangerously_peek()
.decrypt(subcredential, hsc_desc_enc)?;
let new_bounds = unchecked_desc
.intersect(&inner_timerangebound)
.map(|(b1, b2)| (b1.cloned(), b2.cloned()));
(inner_timerangebound, new_bounds)
};
let hsdesc = inner_desc
.check_valid_at(&valid_at)
.map_err(|e| E::InnerValidation(e.into()))?
.map_err(|e| E::InnerValidation(e.into()))?;
// If we've reached this point, it means the descriptor is valid at specified time. This
// means the time bounds of the two layers definitely intersect, so new_bounds **must** be
// Some. It is a bug if new_bounds is None.
let new_bounds = new_bounds
.ok_or_else(|| internal!("failed to compute TimerangeBounds for a valid descriptor"))?;
Ok(TimerangeBound::new(hsdesc, new_bounds))
/// Always returns at least one introduction point,
/// and never more than [`NUM_INTRO_POINT_MAX`](tor_hscrypto::NUM_INTRO_POINT_MAX).
/// (Descriptors which have fewer or more are dealt with during parsing.)
/// Accessor function.
// TODO: We'd like to derive this, but amplify::Getters would give us &Vec<>,
// not &[].
// Perhaps someday we can use derive_deftly, or add as_ref() support?
pub fn intro_points(&self) -> &[IntroPointDesc] {
&self.intro_points
/// Return true if this onion service claims to be a non-anonymous "single
/// onion service".
/// (We should always anonymize our own connection to an onion service.)
pub fn is_single_onion_service(&self) -> bool {
self.is_single_onion_service
/// Return true if this onion service claims that it needs user authentication
/// of some kind in its INTRODUCE messages.
/// (Arti does not currently support sending this kind of authentication.)
pub fn requires_intro_authentication(&self) -> bool {
self.auth_required.is_some()
/// Get a list of offered proof-of-work parameters, at most one per type.
pub fn pow_params(&self) -> &[pow::PowParams] {
self.pow_params.slice()
/// Return the revision counter of this descriptor
pub fn revision(&self) -> RevisionCounter {
self.idx_info.revision
/// An error returned by [`HsDesc::parse_decrypt_validate`], indicating what
/// kind of failure prevented us from validating an onion service descriptor.
/// This is distinct from [`tor_netdoc::Error`](crate::Error) so that we can
/// tell errors that could be the HsDir's fault from those that are definitely
/// protocol violations by the onion service.
#[derive(Clone, Debug, thiserror::Error)]
pub enum HsDescError {
/// An outer object failed parsing: the HsDir should probably have
/// caught this, and not given us this HsDesc.
/// (This can be an innocent error if we happen to know about restrictions
/// that the HsDir does not).
#[error("Parsing failure on outer layer of an onion service descriptor.")]
OuterParsing(#[source] crate::Error),
/// An outer object failed validation: the HsDir should probably have
/// (This can happen erroneously if we think that something is untimely but
/// the HSDir's clock is slightly different, or _was_ different when it
/// decided to give us this object.)
#[error("Validation failure on outer layer of an onion service descriptor.")]
OuterValidation(#[source] crate::Error),
/// Decrypting the inner layer failed because we need to have a decryption key,
/// but we didn't provide one.
/// This is probably our fault.
#[error("Decryption failure on onion service descriptor: missing decryption key")]
MissingDecryptionKey,
/// Decrypting the inner layer failed because, although we provided a key,
/// we did not provide the key we need to decrypt it.
#[error("Decryption failure on onion service descriptor: incorrect decryption key")]
WrongDecryptionKey,
/// Decrypting the inner or middle layer failed because of an issue with the
/// decryption itself.
/// This is the onion service's fault.
#[error("Decryption failure on onion service descriptor: could not decrypt")]
DecryptionFailed,
/// We failed to parse something cryptographic in an inner layer of the
/// onion service descriptor.
/// This is definitely the onion service's fault.
#[error("Parsing failure on inner layer of an onion service descriptor")]
InnerParsing(#[source] crate::Error),
/// We failed to validate something cryptographic in an inner layer of the
#[error("Validation failure on inner layer of an onion service descriptor")]
InnerValidation(#[source] crate::Error),
/// We encountered an internal error.
#[error("Internal error: {0}")]
Bug(#[from] tor_error::Bug),
impl tor_error::HasKind for HsDescError {
fn kind(&self) -> tor_error::ErrorKind {
use tor_error::ErrorKind as EK;
match self {
E::OuterParsing(_) | E::OuterValidation(_) => EK::TorProtocolViolation,
E::MissingDecryptionKey => EK::OnionServiceMissingClientAuth,
E::WrongDecryptionKey => EK::OnionServiceWrongClientAuth,
E::DecryptionFailed | E::InnerParsing(_) | E::InnerValidation(_) => {
EK::OnionServiceProtocolViolation
E::Bug(e) => e.kind(),
impl HsDescError {
/// Return true if this error is one that we should report as a suspicious event.
/// Note that this is a defense-in-depth check
/// for resisting descriptor-length inflation attacks:
/// Our limits on total download size and/or total cell counts are the defense
/// that really matters.
/// (See prop360 for more information.)
pub fn should_report_as_suspicious(&self) -> bool {
use crate::NetdocErrorKind as EK;
#[allow(clippy::match_like_matches_macro)]
E::OuterParsing(e) => match e.netdoc_error_kind() {
EK::ExtraneousSpace => true,
EK::WrongEndingToken => true,
EK::MissingKeyword => true,
_ => false,
},
E::OuterValidation(e) => match e.netdoc_error_kind() {
EK::BadSignature => true,
E::MissingDecryptionKey => false,
E::WrongDecryptionKey => false,
E::DecryptionFailed => false,
E::InnerParsing(_) => false,
E::InnerValidation(_) => false,
E::Bug(_) => false,
impl IntroPointDesc {
/// Start building a description of an intro point
pub fn builder() -> IntroPointDescBuilder {
IntroPointDescBuilder::default()
// TODO: It would be better to derive this too, but this accessor needs to
// return a slice; Getters can only give us a &Vec<> in this case.
pub fn link_specifiers(&self) -> &[EncodedLinkSpec] {
&self.link_specifiers
impl EncryptedHsDesc {
/// Attempt to decrypt both layers of encryption in this onion service
/// If `hsc_desc_enc` is provided, we use it to decrypt the inner encryption layer;
/// otherwise, we require that the inner document is encrypted using the "no
/// restricted discovery" method.
// TODO: Someday we _might_ want to allow a list of keypairs in place of
// `hs_desc_enc`. For now, though, we always know a single key that we want
// to try using, and we don't want to leak any extra information by
// providing other keys that _might_ work. We certainly don't want to
// encourage people to provide every key they know.
pub fn decrypt(
&self,
) -> StdResult<TimerangeBound<SignatureGated<HsDesc>>, HsDescError> {
let blinded_id = self.outer_doc.blinded_id();
let revision_counter = self.outer_doc.revision_counter();
let kp_desc_sign = self.outer_doc.desc_sign_key_id();
// Decrypt the superencryption layer; parse the middle document.
let middle = self
.outer_doc
.decrypt_body(subcredential)
.map_err(|_| E::DecryptionFailed)?;
let middle = std::str::from_utf8(&middle[..]).map_err(|_| {
E::InnerParsing(EK::BadObjectVal.with_msg("Bad utf-8 in middle document"))
})?;
let middle = middle::HsDescMiddle::parse(middle).map_err(E::InnerParsing)?;
// Decrypt the encryption layer and parse the inner document.
let inner = middle.decrypt_inner(
&blinded_id,
revision_counter,
subcredential,
hsc_desc_enc.map(|keys| keys.secret()),
)?;
let inner = std::str::from_utf8(&inner[..]).map_err(|_| {
E::InnerParsing(EK::BadObjectVal.with_msg("Bad utf-8 in inner document"))
let (cert_signing_key, time_bound) =
inner::HsDescInner::parse(inner).map_err(E::InnerParsing)?;
if cert_signing_key.as_ref() != Some(kp_desc_sign) {
return Err(E::InnerValidation(EK::BadObjectVal.with_msg(
"Signing keys in inner document did not match those in outer document",
)));
// Construct the HsDesc!
let time_bound = time_bound.dangerously_map(|sig_bound| {
sig_bound.dangerously_map(|inner| HsDesc {
idx_info: IndexInfo::from_outer_doc(&self.outer_doc),
auth_required: inner.intro_auth_types,
is_single_onion_service: inner.single_onion_service,
intro_points: inner.intro_points,
pow_params: inner.pow_params,
Ok(time_bound)
/// Create a new `IndexInfo` from the outer part of an onion service descriptor.
fn from_outer_doc(outer_layer: outer::HsDescOuter) -> Self {
EncryptedHsDesc {
outer_doc: outer_layer,
impl IndexInfo {
fn from_outer_doc(outer: &outer::HsDescOuter) -> Self {
IndexInfo {
lifetime: outer.lifetime,
signing_cert_expires: outer.desc_signing_key_cert.expiry(),
revision: outer.revision_counter(),
/// Create a new `StoredHsDescMeta` from the outer part of an onion service descriptor.
let blinded_id = outer.blinded_id();
let idx_info = IndexInfo::from_outer_doc(outer);
StoredHsDescMeta {
blinded_id,
idx_info,
/// Test data
#[cfg(any(test, feature = "testing"))]
#[allow(missing_docs)]
#[allow(clippy::missing_docs_in_private_items)]
#[allow(clippy::unwrap_used)]
pub mod test_data {
use super::*;
use hex_literal::hex;
pub const TEST_DATA: &str = include_str!("../../testdata/hsdesc1.txt");
pub const TEST_SUBCREDENTIAL: [u8; 32] =
hex!("78210A0D2C72BB7A0CAF606BCD938B9A3696894FDDDBC3B87D424753A7E3DF37");
// This HsDesc uses DescEnc authentication.
pub const TEST_DATA_2: &str = include_str!("../../testdata/hsdesc2.txt");
pub const TEST_DATA_TIMEPERIOD_2: u64 = 19397;
// paozpdhgz2okvc6kgbxvh2bnfsmt4xergrtcl4obkhopyvwxkpjzvoad.onion
pub const TEST_HSID_2: [u8; 32] =
hex!("781D978CE6CE9CAA8BCA306F53E82D2C993E5C91346625F1C151DCFC56D753D3");
pub const TEST_SUBCREDENTIAL_2: [u8; 32] =
hex!("24A133E905102BDA9A6AFE57F901366A1B8281865A91F1FE0853E4B50CC8B070");
// SACGOAEODFGCYY22NYZV45ZESFPFLDGLMBWFACKEO34XGHASSAMQ (base32)
pub const TEST_PUBKEY_2: [u8; 32] =
hex!("900467008E194C2C635A6E335E7724915E558CCB606C50094476F9731C129019");
// SDZNMD4RP4SCH4EYTTUZPFRZINNFWAOPPKZ6BINZAC7LREV24RBQ (base32)
pub const TEST_SECKEY_2: [u8; 32] =
hex!("90F2D60F917F2423F0989CE9979639435A5B01CF7AB3E0A1B900BEB892BAE443");
/// K_hs_blind_id that can be used to parse [`TEST_DATA`]
/// `pub(crate)` mostly because it's difficult to describe what TP it's for.
pub(crate) const TEST_DATA_HS_BLIND_ID: [u8; 32] =
hex!("43cc0d62fc6252f578705ca645a46109e265290343b1137e90189744b20b3f2d");
/// Obtain a testing [`HsDesc`]
pub fn test_parsed_hsdesc() -> Result<HsDesc> {
let blinded_id = TEST_DATA_HS_BLIND_ID.into();
let desc = HsDesc::parse(TEST_DATA, &blinded_id)?
.check_signature()?
.check_valid_at(&humantime::parse_rfc3339("2023-01-23T15:00:00Z").unwrap())
.unwrap()
.decrypt(&TEST_SUBCREDENTIAL.into(), None)
.unwrap();
let desc = desc
.check_valid_at(&humantime::parse_rfc3339("2023-01-24T03:00:00Z").unwrap())
let desc = desc.check_signature().unwrap();
Ok(desc)
#[cfg(test)]
mod test {
// @@ begin test lint list maintained by maint/add_warning @@
#![allow(clippy::bool_assert_comparison)]
#![allow(clippy::clone_on_copy)]
#![allow(clippy::dbg_macro)]
#![allow(clippy::mixed_attributes_style)]
#![allow(clippy::print_stderr)]
#![allow(clippy::print_stdout)]
#![allow(clippy::single_char_pattern)]
#![allow(clippy::unwrap_used)]
#![allow(clippy::unchecked_time_subtraction)]
#![allow(clippy::useless_vec)]
#![allow(clippy::needless_pass_by_value)]
//! <!-- @@ end test lint list maintained by maint/add_warning @@ -->
use std::time::Duration;
use super::test_data::*;
use tor_hscrypto::{pk::HsIdKey, time::TimePeriod};
use tor_llcrypto::pk::ed25519;
#[test]
fn parse_meta_good() -> Result<()> {
let meta = StoredHsDescMeta::parse(TEST_DATA)?
assert_eq!(meta.blinded_id.as_ref(), &TEST_DATA_HS_BLIND_ID);
assert_eq!(
Duration::try_from(meta.idx_info.lifetime).unwrap(),
Duration::from_secs(60 * 180)
meta.idx_info.signing_cert_expires,
humantime::parse_rfc3339("2023-01-26T03:00:00Z").unwrap()
assert_eq!(meta.idx_info.revision, RevisionCounter::from(19655750));
Ok(())
fn parse_desc_good() -> Result<()> {
let wrong_blinded_id = [12; 32].into();
let desc = HsDesc::parse(TEST_DATA, &wrong_blinded_id);
assert!(desc.is_err());
let desc = test_parsed_hsdesc()?;
Duration::try_from(desc.idx_info.lifetime).unwrap(),
desc.idx_info.signing_cert_expires,
assert_eq!(desc.idx_info.revision, RevisionCounter::from(19655750));
assert!(desc.auth_required.is_none());
assert_eq!(desc.is_single_onion_service, false);
assert_eq!(desc.intro_points.len(), 3);
let ipt0 = &desc.intro_points()[0];
ipt0.ipt_ntor_key().as_bytes(),
&hex!("553BF9F9E1979D6F5D5D7D20BB3FE7272E32E22B6E86E35C76A7CA8A377E402F")
// TODO TEST: Perhaps add tests for other intro point fields.
/// Get an EncryptedHsDesc corresponding to `TEST_DATA_2`.
fn get_test2_encrypted() -> EncryptedHsDesc {
let id: HsIdKey = ed25519::PublicKey::from_bytes(&TEST_HSID_2).unwrap().into();
let period = TimePeriod::new(
humantime::parse_duration("24 hours").unwrap(),
humantime::parse_rfc3339("2023-02-09T12:00:00Z").unwrap(),
humantime::parse_duration("12 hours").unwrap(),
)
assert_eq!(period.interval_num(), TEST_DATA_TIMEPERIOD_2);
let (blind_id, subcredential) = id.compute_blinded_key(period).unwrap();
blind_id.as_bytes(),
&hex!("706628758208395D461AA0F460A5E76E7B828C66B5E794768592B451302E961D")
assert_eq!(subcredential.as_ref(), &TEST_SUBCREDENTIAL_2);
HsDesc::parse(TEST_DATA_2, &blind_id.into())
.check_valid_at(&humantime::parse_rfc3339("2023-02-09T12:00:00Z").unwrap())
fn parse_desc_auth_missing() {
// If we try to decrypt TEST_DATA_2 with no ClientDescEncKey, we get a
// failure.
let encrypted = get_test2_encrypted();
let subcredential = TEST_SUBCREDENTIAL_2.into();
let with_no_auth = encrypted.decrypt(&subcredential, None);
assert!(with_no_auth.is_err());
fn parse_desc_auth_good() {
// But if we try to decrypt TEST_DATA_2 with the correct ClientDescEncKey, we get a
// the data inside!
let pk = curve25519::PublicKey::from(TEST_PUBKEY_2).into();
let sk = curve25519::StaticSecret::from(TEST_SECKEY_2).into();
let desc = encrypted
.decrypt(&subcredential, Some(&HsClientDescEncKeypair::new(pk, sk)))