//! Support for cookie authentication within the RPC protocol.

use fs_mistrust::Mistrust;

use safelog::Sensitive;

#[cfg(feature = "rpc-server")]

use std::convert::Infallible;

use std::{

    fs, io,

    path::{Path, PathBuf},

    str::FromStr,

    sync::Arc,

};

use subtle::ConstantTimeEq as _;

use tiny_keccak::Hasher as _;

use zeroize::Zeroizing;

/// A secret cookie value, used in RPC authentication.

#[derive(Clone, Debug)]

pub struct Cookie {

    /// The value of the cookie.

    value: Sensitive<Zeroizing<[u8; COOKIE_LEN]>>,

}

impl AsRef<[u8; COOKIE_LEN]> for Cookie {

}

/// Length of an authentication cookie.

pub const COOKIE_LEN: usize = 32;

/// Length of `COOKIE_PREFIX`.

pub const COOKIE_PREFIX_LEN: usize = 32;

/// Length of the MAC values we use for cookie authentication.

const COOKIE_MAC_LEN: usize = 32;

/// Length of the nonce values we use for cookie authentication.

const COOKIE_NONCE_LEN: usize = 32;

/// A value used to differentiate cookie files,

/// and as a personalization parameter within the RPC cookie authentication protocol.

///

/// This is equivalent to `P` in the RPC cookie spec.

pub const COOKIE_PREFIX: &[u8; COOKIE_PREFIX_LEN] = b"====== arti-rpc-cookie-v1 ======";

/// Customization string used to initialize TupleHash.

const TUPLEHASH_CUSTOMIZATION: &[u8] = b"arti-rpc-cookie-v1";

impl Cookie {

    /// Read an RPC cookie from a provided path.

        use std::io::Read;

    /// Create a new RPC cookie and store it at a provided path,

    /// overwriting any previous file at that location.

    #[cfg(feature = "rpc-server")]

        use std::io::Write;

        // NOTE: We do not use the "write and rename" pattern here,

        // since it doesn't preserve file permissions.

    /// Create a new random cookie.

    /// Return an appropriately personalized TupleHash instance, keyed from this cookie.

    /// Compute the "server_mac" value as in the RPC cookie authentication protocol.

        // `server_mac = MAC(cookie, "Server", socket_canonical, client_nonce)`

    /// Compute the "client_mac" value as in the RPC cookie authentication protocol.

        // `client_mac = MAC(cookie, "Client", socket_canonical, server_nonce)`

}

/// An error that has occurred while trying to load or create a cookie.

#[derive(Clone, Debug, thiserror::Error)]

#[non_exhaustive]

pub enum CookieAccessError {

    /// Unable to access cookie file due to an error from fs_mistrust

    #[error("Unable to access cookie file")]

    Access(#[from] fs_mistrust::Error),

    /// Unable to access cookie file due to an IO error.

    #[error("IO error while accessing cookie file")]

    Io(#[source] Arc<io::Error>),

    /// Calling `parent()` or `file_name() on the cookie path failed.

    #[error("Could not find parent directory or filename for cookie file")]

    UnusablePath,

    /// Cookie file wasn't in the right format.

    #[error("Path did not point to a cookie file")]

    FileFormat,

}

impl From<io::Error> for CookieAccessError {

}

impl crate::HasClientErrorAction for CookieAccessError {

        use crate::ClientErrorAction as A;

        use CookieAccessError as E;

            // We use the banner to make sure that we never read the cookie file before it is ready,

            // so we don't need to worry about a partially written file.

        }

}

/// The location of a cookie on disk, and the rules to access it.

#[derive(Debug, Clone)]

pub struct CookieLocation {

    /// Where the cookie is on disk.

    pub(crate) path: PathBuf,

    /// The mistrust we should use when loading it.

    pub(crate) mistrust: Mistrust,

}

impl CookieLocation {

    /// Try to read the cookie at this location.

}

/// An error when decoding a hexadecimal value.

#[derive(Clone, Debug, thiserror::Error)]

#[non_exhaustive]

pub enum HexError {

    /// Hexadecimal value was wrong, or had the wrong length.

    #[error("Invalid hexadecimal value")]

    InvalidHex,

}

/// A random nonce used during cookie authentication protocol.

#[derive(Clone, Debug, serde_with::SerializeDisplay, serde_with::DeserializeFromStr)]

pub struct CookieAuthNonce(Sensitive<Zeroizing<[u8; COOKIE_NONCE_LEN]>>);

impl CookieAuthNonce {

    /// Create a new random nonce.

    /// Convert this nonce to a hexadecimal string.

    /// Decode a nonce from a hexadecimal string.

    ///

    /// (Case-insensitive, no leading "0x" marker.  Output must be COOKIE_NONCE_LEN bytes long.)

}

impl std::fmt::Display for CookieAuthNonce {

}

impl FromStr for CookieAuthNonce {

    type Err = HexError;

}

/// A MAC derived during the cookie authentication protocol.

#[derive(Clone, Debug, serde_with::SerializeDisplay, serde_with::DeserializeFromStr)]

pub struct CookieAuthMac(Sensitive<Zeroizing<[u8; COOKIE_MAC_LEN]>>);

impl CookieAuthMac {

    /// Construct a MAC by finalizing the provided hasher.

    /// Convert this MAC to a hexadecimal string.

    /// Decode a MAC from a hexadecimal string.

    ///

    /// (Case-insensitive, no leading "0x" marker.  Output must be COOKIE_MAC_LEN bytes long.)

}

impl std::fmt::Display for CookieAuthMac {

}

impl FromStr for CookieAuthMac {

    type Err = HexError;

}

impl PartialEq for CookieAuthMac {

}

impl Eq for CookieAuthMac {}

#[cfg(test)]

mod test {

    // @@ begin test lint list maintained by maint/add_warning @@

    #![allow(clippy::bool_assert_comparison)]

    #![allow(clippy::clone_on_copy)]

    #![allow(clippy::dbg_macro)]

    #![allow(clippy::mixed_attributes_style)]

    #![allow(clippy::print_stderr)]

    #![allow(clippy::print_stdout)]

    #![allow(clippy::single_char_pattern)]

    #![allow(clippy::unwrap_used)]

    #![allow(clippy::unchecked_time_subtraction)]

    #![allow(clippy::useless_vec)]

    #![allow(clippy::needless_pass_by_value)]

    #![allow(clippy::string_slice)] // See arti#2571

    //! <!-- @@ end test lint list maintained by maint/add_warning @@ -->

    use super::*;

    use crate::testing::tempdir;

    // Simple case: test creating and loading cookies.

    #[test]

    #[cfg(all(feature = "rpc-client", feature = "rpc-server"))]

    fn cookie_file() {

        let (_tempdir, dir, mistrust) = tempdir();

        let path1 = dir.join("foo/foo.cookie");

        let path2 = dir.join("bar.cookie");

        let s_c1 = Cookie::create(path1.as_path(), &mut rand::rng(), &mistrust).unwrap();

        let s_c2 = Cookie::create(path2.as_path(), &mut rand::rng(), &mistrust).unwrap();

        assert_ne!(s_c1.as_ref(), s_c2.as_ref());

        let c_c1 = Cookie::load(path1.as_path(), &mistrust).unwrap();

        let c_c2 = Cookie::load(path2.as_path(), &mistrust).unwrap();

        assert_eq!(s_c1.as_ref(), c_c1.as_ref());

        assert_eq!(s_c2.as_ref(), c_c2.as_ref());

    }

    /// Helper: Compute a TupleHash over the elements in input.

    fn tuplehash(customization: &[u8], input: &[&[u8]]) -> [u8; 32] {

        let mut th = tiny_keccak::TupleHash::v128(customization);

        for v in input {

            th.update(v);

        }

        let mut output: [u8; 32] = Default::default();

        th.finalize(&mut output);

        output

    }

    // Conformance test test for cryptography for cookie auth.

    #[test]

    fn auth_roundtrip() {

        let addr = "127.0.0.1:9999";

        let mut rng = rand::rng();

        let client_nonce = CookieAuthNonce::new(&mut rng);

        let server_nonce = CookieAuthNonce::new(&mut rng);

        let cookie = Cookie::new(&mut rng);

        let smac = cookie.server_mac(&client_nonce, &server_nonce, addr);

        let cmac = cookie.client_mac(&client_nonce, &server_nonce, addr);

        // `server_mac = MAC(cookie, "Server", socket_canonical, client_nonce)`

        let smac_expected = tuplehash(

            TUPLEHASH_CUSTOMIZATION,

            &[

                &**cookie.value,

                b"Server",

                addr.as_bytes(),

                &**client_nonce.0,

                &**server_nonce.0,

            ],

        );

        // `client_mac = MAC(cookie, "Client", socket_canonical, server_nonce)`

        let cmac_expected = tuplehash(

            TUPLEHASH_CUSTOMIZATION,

            &[

                &**cookie.value,

                b"Client",

                addr.as_bytes(),

                &**client_nonce.0,

                &**server_nonce.0,

            ],

        );

        assert_eq!(**smac.0, smac_expected);

        assert_eq!(**cmac.0, cmac_expected);

        let smac_hex = smac.to_hex();

        let smac2 = CookieAuthMac::from_hex(smac_hex.as_str()).unwrap();

        assert_eq!(smac, smac2);

        assert_ne!(cmac, smac); // Fails with P = 2^256 ;)

    }

    /// Basic tests for tuplehash crate, to make sure it does what we expect.

    #[test]

    fn tuplehash_testvec() {

        // From http://csrc.nist.gov/groups/ST/toolkit/documents/Examples/TupleHash_samples.pdf

        use hex_literal::hex;

        let val = tuplehash(b"", &[&hex!("00 01 02"), &hex!("10 11 12 13 14 15")]);

        assert_eq!(

            val,

            hex!(

                "C5 D8 78 6C 1A FB 9B 82 11 1A B3 4B 65 B2 C0 04

                 8F A6 4E 6D 48 E2 63 26 4C E1 70 7D 3F FC 8E D1"

            )

        );

        let val = tuplehash(

            b"My Tuple App",

            &[&hex!("00 01 02"), &hex!("10 11 12 13 14 15")],

        );

        assert_eq!(

            val,

            hex!(

                "75 CD B2 0F F4 DB 11 54 E8 41 D7 58 E2 41 60 C5

                 4B AE 86 EB 8C 13 E7 F5 F4 0E B3 55 88 E9 6D FB"

            )

        );

        let val = tuplehash(

            b"My Tuple App",

            &[

                &hex!("00 01 02"),

                &hex!("10 11 12 13 14 15"),

                &hex!("20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28"),

            ],

        );

        assert_eq!(

            val,

            hex!(

                "E6 0F 20 2C 89 A2 63 1E DA 8D 4C 58 8C A5 FD 07

                 F3 9E 51 51 99 8D EC CF 97 3A DB 38 04 BB 6E 84"

            )

        );

    }

    #[test]

    fn hex_encoding() {

        let s = "0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000012345678ABCDEF";

        let expected = [

            0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0x12, 0x34,

            0x56, 0x78, 0xAB, 0xCD, 0xEF,

        ];

        assert_eq!(s.len(), COOKIE_NONCE_LEN * 2);

        assert_eq!(s.len(), COOKIE_MAC_LEN * 2);

        let cn = CookieAuthNonce::from_hex(s).unwrap();

        assert_eq!(**cn.0, expected);

        assert_eq!(cn.to_hex().as_str(), s);

        let cm = CookieAuthMac::from_hex(s).unwrap();

        assert_eq!(**cm.0, expected);

        assert_eq!(cm.to_hex().as_str(), s);

        let s2 = s.to_ascii_lowercase();

        let cn2 = CookieAuthNonce::from_hex(&s2).unwrap();

        let cm2 = CookieAuthMac::from_hex(&s2).unwrap();

        assert_eq!(cn2.0, cn.0);

        assert_eq!(cm2, cm);

        for bad in [

            // too short

            "12345678",

            // bad characters

            "0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000012345678XXXXXX",

            // too long

            "0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000012345678ABCDEF12345678",

        ] {

            dbg!(bad);

            assert!(CookieAuthNonce::from_hex(bad).is_err());

            assert!(CookieAuthMac::from_hex(bad).is_err());

        }

    }

}